INTRODUCTION
Why are bruises so perversely satisfying? Despite the aesthetically unpleasant discoloring of the skin that accompanies them, bruises serve as an externally visible signal that effectively communicates and legitimizes pain. Unfortunately, the majority of pain that people endure does not manifest itself through bruising, and subjective measures are frequently used to rate and quantify levels of discomfort. Consequently, there is often a disconnect between an individual's perception of pain and an observer's understanding of its degree or intensity. 1 Neuroscience research has produced many significant findings over the past decades, including localizing specific functions to certain regions or circuits within the brain. However, there is no unified neural area devoted to pain processing, as it involves a multifaceted 'matrix' distributed across many neural regions.
2 While our comprehension of the phenomenon is constantly evolving, within the past two years, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have greatly accelerated the field 3 through identifying and modeling 'neural signatures' of pain. 4 These measures can detect the presence of acute and chronic pain and distinguish them from other sensations, such as reactions to non-painful heat as well as feelings of social rejection. 5 Not only are these findings important in the domain of neuroscience, but they are also pertinent to the realm of tort law.
Current tort doctrine distinguishes between physical, emotional, and invisible harms. Pain, especially of the chronic subtype, is considered an invisible harm, which includes physical or emotional injuries that cannot readily be seen by an observer. 6 Courts impose a high threshold of proof for these harms, in part due to the lack of objective measures available to identify or quantify them. 7 The recent advancements in pain neuroimaging have thus piqued the interest of legal scholars for their possible application to tort law, particularly with regard to their potential for demonstrating the presence of pain in plaintiffs. 8 The concept of employing neuroimaging as an objective measure in the courtroom is neither novel nor inconceivable. Over the past few years, neuroscientists, legal scholars, ethicists, and even judges have had to deal with the question of using neuroimaging for lie detection in trials. 9 The science is still in its infancy, but this topic has nevertheless garnered significant controversy and debate. Furthermore, despite the overlap in proposed applications, a comparative analysis of fMRI for pain versus deception detection is largely absent from the current literature. This article will therefore briefly summarize recent studies in both pain and deception neuroimaging, explore commonalities between the two techniques and their respective applications to the legal system, and conclude with an analysis of several key differentiating factors. Contrasting fMRI for pain versus deception detection is necessary to determine whether pain neuroimaging will find a place in the current tort system or fade into oblivion in spite of its potential promise.
THE NEUROSCIENCE BEHIND PAIN NEUROIMAGING
Recent advancements in pain neuroimaging have employed fMRI technology, which provides an indirect measure of brain activity during various tasks. The basic premise of this technique is that more engaged areas of the brain will require higher levels of oxygen, which is transported via the hemoglobin found in red blood cells. fMRI technology detects changes in the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal, and researchers can subsequently display this information by superimposing a 'map' of active areas over a structural image of the brain. 10 The highlighted regions reflect the difference in activity during a task versus that during resting state. 11 In analyzing imaging results, researchers can use computer algorithms created with preliminary sets of data to predict activation patterns in subsequent datasets ('Machine Learning'). 12 fMRI experiments have been conducted to elucidate both acute and chronic pain processes. While a multitude of studies have made important contributions to the field, this paper will focus on recent findings that purport to show a pain signature, which allows for detection on an individual level. In 2011, Brown and colleagues 13 applied thermal stimuli to the forearm of healthy participants in two different conditions: hot but not painful, and painful (to an intense but not unbearable level). Via Machine Learning techniques, the researchers utilized fMRI data from a subset of subjects to create algorithms for these two conditions. When used to analyze activity patterns from the remaining subjects, the algorithm correctly differentiated between painful and nonpainful stimuli with 81% accuracy. Moreover, the authors found increased activity during the painful conditions in areas commonly associated with the pain matrix, such as the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices as well as the insular cortex. Using a similar paradigm, Wager and associates 14 reported a pain signature with 93% accuracy. In two subsequent follow-up tasks, the researchers distinguished acute pain from social feelings of rejection, and demonstrated the reduction of prediction accuracy upon giving participants analgesic medications. Furthermore, as a testament to the field's increasingly complex understanding of pain, Favilla and colleagues 15 142 r The case for pain neuroimaging in the courtroom: lessons from deception detection ranked brain areas according to their time course in contributing to the perception of pain, specifying regions most associated with perceived pain intensity. For example, whereas the mid-cingulate and posterior insula were active throughout the pain experience, the parietal operculum's role seemed isolated to the beginning stages. Additionally, abnormalities in these regions might inform future research on patients exhibiting excess amounts of pain. 16 Although the significance of these three experiments should not be overlooked, it is nevertheless important to note that they all involved temporary manifestations of acute pain in healthy patients.
In contrast, studies examining chronic pain have compared healthy populations to chronic pain patients in deriving their neurological signatures. In a Machine Learning experiment exploring chronic back pain, Callan and associates 17 administered painful electrical stimulations to the lower back of both chronic pain patients and healthy controls. Their algorithm correctly differentiated between pain perceptions in the two subject groups with 92.3% accuracy. The authors speculated that the difference in pain processing observed in chronic pain patients was a result of functional reorganization in brain regions such as the primary somatosensory cortex and the inferior parietal cortex. Bagarinao and colleagues 18 conducted a similar study in patients with chronic pelvic pain, but reported much lower accuracy rates (73%). While not Machine Learningbased, a study by Kucyi and researchers 19 used fMRI technology to demonstrate that chronic pain patients with temporomandibular disorder show atypical resting state functional activity in the default mode network, a group of brain regions believed to impact pain rumination.
Although tremendous progress has been made over the last few years in pain neuroimaging, the field is still too nascent to be applied to real-world contexts. Future research should focus on improving accuracy rates and expanding studies to include greater varieties of pain intensities and locations. Additionally, since a standardized method of data interpretation would optimize consistency for settings such as the courtroom, researchers will need to determine which Machine Learning techniques work best. While current neuroimaging protocols might be sufficient for chronic pain patients (given their differential neural activation patterns compared to healthy controls), researchers must explore acute pain detection among subjects exhibiting pre-existing pain. Theoretically, if an individual suffering from acute pain in his left arm were to receive a non-painful stimulus to both arms, the resulting activation patterns from the stimulation of each arm should be predictably different, assuming that the pain threshold would be lower for the already sensitive left side. Yet, studies would need to test this hypothesis. Overall, despite the shortcomings, the current pace of progress in this field suggests that pain neuroimaging holds substantial promise. 16 
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THE NEUROSCIENCE OF DECEPTION DETECTION Whereas studies involving neuroimaging of pain generally incorporate common protocols from one experiment to the next, those examining the use of fMRI for lie detection are more heterogeneous. Part of this diversity can be explained by variations in study design for mock crime scenarios, 20 as minor discrepancies among methodologies can lead to significant differences in accuracy rates. 21 Even so, researchers have highlighted a relatively consistent set of neural regions (particularly the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices) that become more active during conditions of deceit than honesty. 22 Early studies of detection deception relied on group level findings by averaging results across multiple participants. 23 Given the focus of this article on new developments as well as the importance of detection in individuals for legal applications, only studies which analyze deception on the individual level will be discussed. One such study was conducted by Davatzikos and colleagues, 24 who used Machine Learning techniques to predict deception. Subjects were told to lie about having one of two possible playing cards, and the experimenters were not aware of which card the subjects chose. During the scanning portion of the test, participants clicked buttons to indicate whether they did or did not have the card presented on the screen. Only a small proportion of the trials thus included the lying condition since hundreds of images were displayed. The authors were able to predict deceptive responses with an accuracy rate of 88%. However, critics have noted the potentially confounding nature of the motor demands in this study, as the number of times the button was pressed for truthful conditions far surpassed that of the lying ones. 25 Kozel and associates 26 employed a different paradigm to examine deception on an individual participant level. Using a mock crime scenario intricately designed to approximate the pressures and stress inherent in the real world, participants in the crime condition were tasked with stealthily destroying evidence of previous infractions. Meanwhile, participants in the no-crime group were instructed to lie about an alibi during the time these evidence-tampering crimes were committed, but did not actually commit the crimes themselves. All participants then answered both neutral and crime-related questions while in the fMRI scanner. In a subsequent task, each participant was told to steal a ring or a watch and to lie about taking either when asked during scanning. The researchers analyzed activation patterns in the ring-watch scenario in order to identify participants for whom they could accurately detect deception during this simple task. When the researchers then tried to predict which of the individuals in this subgroup 20 Farah et al., supra note 9, at 124. 21 were in the mock crime condition, they correctly identified all members of the crime group, while incorrectly identifying 66% of participants in the no-crime condition. Whereas this study exemplified issues of specificity without countermeasures, Ganis and colleagues 27 demonstrated the effects of using deliberate methods to beat the system. Accuracy rates during the normal paradigm were 100%, but when participants were instructed to make unnoticeable movements in certain fingers or toes, the rates declined to 33%. The authors noted that cognitive countermeasures would be similarly effective-for example, participants could think of specific memories in order to make answers to neutral questions seem more personally relevant.
Although neuroimaging for lie detection has improved considerably over the past decade, there are a number of frequently cited concerns with the current state of the field. In addition to vulnerabilities to countermeasures, critics question whether deception is what is actually being tested, as opposed to memory or attention. 28 Moreover, deception in the real world often entails highly emotional and complex situations, which might never be replicable in the lab. 29 Lastly, as evidenced by Kozel and colleagues' study, even if neuroimaging can accurately identify those who are telling lies, the risk of making false predictions remains precariously high.
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NEUROIMAGING FOR PAIN AND DECEPTION: WHY THE COMPARISON
IS IMPORTANT Before contrasting respective applications of pain and deception neuroimaging to the courtroom setting, it is necessary to explicate the importance of making this comparison in the first place. The legal system is a conservative domain, relying on laws and jurisprudence that have evolved over centuries. Proposed sources of evidence must achieve acceptance not only among the scientific community but also among judges, who are responsible for determining relevancy and admissibility. 31 Despite the fact that using fMRI for deception detection could one day be a valuable resource for the courts, its current state of reliability is remarkably far from what it would need to be. Nevertheless, in three recent trials, defendants and witnesses have tried to use the technology to confirm their credibility; in each case, the judge ruled the evidence to be inadmissible. 32 Attempts to introduce the technology well before it was established and reliable have significantly set back the prospect of applying deception neuroimaging to the courtroom, as many scholars, judges, and members of the public are now skeptical of the idea.
While pain neuroimaging has distinct benefits and weaknesses, its inexorable association with fMRI for lie detection cannot be denied. However, by learning from the mistakes with deception detection and analyzing the ways in which the two techniques overlap and diverge, we can form a better idea of the extent to which pain neuroimaging may be accepted in the courtroom as well as anticipate potential roadblocks that might arise.
NEUROIMAGING FOR PAIN AND DECEPTION: THE SHARED PROBLEMS The most practical connection between neuroimaging for pain versus deception is that both applications seek to provide objective measures for issues that are notoriously difficult to detect with the naked eye. While researchers have elucidated common activation patterns for the respective processes, some studies report activation in areas not found in other experiments. The lack of exclusively confined networks might therefore elicit concerns with reliability for both phenomena. 34 An additional problem involves contrived laboratory settings that might not reflect real-world complexities. For example, the type of deception that would be implicated in criminal trials would typically entail very high stakes and a slew of concurrent emotions. 35 Moreover, people undergoing an fMRI-based lie detection test would never be instructed to lie, which is a prominent feature of current deception studies. 36 Similarly, the acute pain produced in the lab lasts for a matter of seconds. It is unclear whether acute pain from a persistent injury would present the same activation patterns observed with temporarily induced pain.
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Another common issue revolves around the limitations of fMRI technology. Although it has better spatial and temporal resolution than other brain imaging techniques, fMRI still cannot account for factors such as the actual speed at which neurons fire. 38 Furthermore, since the technique relies on blood flow, it is an indirect measure of brain activity and does not tell us exactly what is occurring at the neuronal level. 39 Other concerns involve vulnerabilities to misinterpretation of findings and spurious results due to multiple statistical comparisons. 40 However, some scholars believe that these criticisms might be overemphasized.
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In addition to issues with the protocols and techniques themselves, both uses of neuroimaging raise questions specific to the legal setting. To start, how accurate does the technology need to be in order to be admitted in court? Deciding what threshold is acceptable for admissibility will most likely contain some degree of arbitrariness. Moreover, measurements of accuracy will need to consider levels of sensitivity (correctly identifying those who are lying or in pain) and specificity (correctly identifying those who are not lying or are not in pain).
